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In this paper we re-consider the effects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates and 
forward premia. In the recent empirical literature, these effects have been predominantly 
described as puzzling, in that they would include delayed overshooting of the exchange rate 
as well as persistent deviations from uncovered interest parity. We specify an empirical model 
that in particular (i) allows for simultaneous multi-country adjustments in response to 
monetary policy shocks, and (ii) takes advantage of the identifying restrictions for monetary 
policy shocks implied by empirically supported long-run relations between the 
macroeconomic variables under consideration. Using monthly data from 1978 to 2006 for a 
panel of nine industrial economies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States), we find that U.S. Dollar effective and 
bilateral real exchange rates appreciate on impact after a contractionary U.S. monetary policy 
shock, and that there is no delay in the overshooting of the U.S. Dollar. Furthermore, there is 
no persistent significant forward premium. These results are consistent with the real exchange 
rate effects of monetary policy shocks in sticky price macroeconomic models, though the 
results of this paper also suggest that the latter models should be specified so as to capture 
simultaneous multi-country adjustments to shocks. 
JEL-Code: C33, E52, F31. 
Keywords: monetary policy, exchange rate overshooting, forward premium, global vector 





Goethe University Frankfurt 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
Department of Money and Macroeconomics 
Grueneburgplatz 1 (House of Finance) 








Goethe University Frankfurt 
xuazhang@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de 
 
We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Don Harding, Nelson Mark and Ron 
Smith, as well as from seminar and conference participants at Australian National University, 
European Central Bank, Fundação Getulio Vargas, Goethe University Frankfurt, Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology, International Monetary Fund, Notre Dame University, 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, University of Bonn, University of Maastricht, University of 
Munich, and University of Rotterdam. 1 Introduction
It has been a long-standing question in both theoretical and empirical macroeconomics how a
change in a country’s monetary policy aﬀects the external value of its currency. The recent debate
surrounding the International Monetary Fund’s recommendation to the Central Bank of Iceland in
fall of 2008 to dramatically raise interest rates in an attempt to prevent continued depreciation of
the Iceland Krona is just one example highlighting the continued topicality of this question.
From the perspective of macroeconomic theory, a - if not the - key contribution towards resolu-
tion of this question still is Dornbusch’s (1976) exchange rate overshooting model, predicting that
in response to a contraction of domestic monetary policy, the real exchange rate - due to a liquidity
eﬀect and a no-arbitrage restriction implied by uncovered interest parity - will exhibit an impact
appreciation, that is followed by a gradual depreciation. This gradual depreciation continues until
the long-run equilibrium - that involves return to the original real exchange rate equilibrium in
line with purchasing power parity - is reached. In the recent new open economy macroeconomics
literature, the exchange rate overshooting mechanism has been re-examined on the basis of dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium models that make reference to the three core components of
the overshooting mechanism: a liquidity eﬀect of monetary policy, an interest parity relation, and
long-run purchasing power parity. To highlight just two contributions to this literature: Steins-
son (2008) argues that in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating inter alia
staggered price setting, local currency pricing, home biased preferences and heterogeneous factor
markets, the real exchange rate exhibits peak overshooting in response to a monetary shock after
one or two months, and thereafter decays exponentially, consistent with Dornbusch (1976). Bergin
(2006) estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model inter alia including monopolis-
tically competitive ﬁrms, sluggish price setting, capital accumulation subject to adjustment costs
as well as a risk-premium-augmented interest parity relation, and ﬁnds that the real exchange
rate exhibits impact overshooting, followed by a gradual return to long-run equilibrium. Benigno
(2004) argues that the details of the dynamic adjustment pattern of the real exchange rate after a
monetary policy shock depend on the relative degrees of wage/price stickiness in the domestic and
foreign economies, as well as the degree of interest rate smoothing of monetary policy domestically
and abroad.
The predominant strand of the empirical literature (including Clarida and Gali, 1994, Eichen-
baum and Evans, 1995, Kim, 2005, and Scholl and Uhlig, 2008), on the other hand, has documented
that in response to a monetary policy contraction the peak appreciation of the nominal and real
exchange rates occurs with sizeable lag only, that is, the impulse response function exhibits a
hump-shape pattern, the so-called “delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle”. Furthermore, the
empirical evidence appears to contradict conditional uncovered interest parity, and suggests sizeable
and persistent arbitrage opportunities in favor of U.S. bonds after a contractionary U.S. monetary
1policy shock, which has been termed the “forward premium/discount puzzle”.1 Figure 1 illus-
trates the “delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle” as well as the “forward premium puzzle”.2
This empirical evidence has been viewed as so strong that in the open economy macroeconomics
literature various mechanisms - such as limited information processing, distortion of beliefs, and
state-dependent pricing - have been advanced that can account for the “delayed exchange rate over-
shooting puzzle” and/or the “forward premium puzzle”; see, for example, Gourinchas and Tornell
(2004), Andersen and Beier (2005), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006), and Landry (2009).
The common framework of the empirical literature have been bilateral (two-country) vector
autoregressions (VARs) that incorporate key macroeconomic variables for the domestic economy
and one foreign economy, and that identify the exchange rate eﬀects of a domestic monetary policy
shock primarily on the basis of a Cholesky decomposition involving a Wold recursive ordering of the
variables contained in the VAR. Recent empirical work employing weaker short-run identiﬁcation
schemes, namely sign restrictions, argues that the two puzzles are not tied to the identiﬁcation of
VARs using Cholesky decompositions; see, in particular, Scholl and Uhlig (2008).
In this paper, we address the question to what extent previous empirical ﬁndings suggesting
the presence of a “delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle” and a “forward premium puzzle”
may have been caused by two issues: (i) Working with bilateral VARs neglects to account for mul-
tilateral (multi-country) simultaneous adjustments of key macroeconomic variables in response to
monetary policy shocks in one given country - even though such multi-country adjustments seem to
be an essential feature for groups of economies with sizeable multilateral trade and ﬁnancial market
linkages. (ii) Identifying monetary policy shocks by imposing short-run restrictions of the form of a
Cholesky decomposition tends to be diﬃcult to reconcile with macroeconomic theory, and does not
take advantage of identiﬁcation restrictions implied by empirically supported long-run relations be-
tween the macroeconomic variables under consideration in the VAR.3 In this paper, then, we specify
a multi-country VAR model for a panel of nine industrial economies (Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States), using monthly
data from 1978 to 2006. On the basis of this multi-country speciﬁcation and exploiting empirically
supported long-run relationships for the identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks, we ﬁnd that U.S.
1The “forward premium puzzle” is separate from unconditional violations of uncovered interest parity as reviewed,
for example, by Engel (1996). It is also worth noting that even papers that have argued that the “delayed exchange
rate overshooting puzzle” may be sensitive to the restrictions imposed in identifying monetary policy shocks, argue
that the “forward premium puzzle” is robust to identiﬁcation issues and is empirically prevalent. See, for example,
Faust and Rogers (2003).
2In Section 2, we will also relate our paper to previous papers in the literature, speciﬁcally Cushman and Zha
(1997), Kim and Roubini (2000), and Bjornland (2009), that have argued that there is no delay of exchange rate
overshooting and/or no evidence of deviations from uncovered interest parity in response to monetary policy shocks.
3The information content of long-run relations for purposes of model identiﬁcation has recently been emphasized
by Pagan and Pesaran (2008).
2Dollar eﬀective and bilateral real exchange rates appreciate on impact after a contractionary U.S.
monetary policy shock, and that there is no delay in the overshooting of the U.S. Dollar. Further-
more, after a contractionary monetary policy shock there is no persistent sizeable deviation from
uncovered interest parity, and therefore no sizeable forward premium. These results are consistent
with the real exchange rate eﬀects of monetary policy shocks in sticky price open economy models,
though the results of this paper also suggest that it will be insightful to extend various prominent
examples of such models - including those of Benigno (2004), Bergin (2006), and Steinsson (2008)
- so as to capture simultaneous multi-country adjustments to shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review the empirical
models considered in the previous literature, with particular emphasis on a benchmark model of
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). In Section 3, we provide a theoretical motivation for studying
multilateral models, and then introduce our empirical multilateral model speciﬁcation in Section 4.
We discuss the measurement of monetary policy indicators for the nine economies we consider as
well as the identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks using empirically supported long-run relations
in Section 5. We present our empirical results in Section 6, and in Section 7 provide various
comparisons between results from our empirical model speciﬁcation and those employed in the
previous literature. Section 8, ﬁnally, concludes. Two appendices contain details on the database
we have assembled for this paper, as well as some tables of empirical results.
2 Review of the Literature
2.1 Methodology of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995)
Almost all of the empirical models considered in the literature to date on the “delayed exchange
rate overshooting puzzle” and the “forward premium puzzle” are bilateral (two-country) vector
autoregressions (VARs).4 We take one of the speciﬁcations in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) as a
benchmark. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) use a bilateral VAR to model the bilateral relationships
of key macroeconomic variables for ﬁve country pairs: the United States versus France, the United
States versus Germany, the United States versus Italy, the United States versus Japan, and the
United States versus the United Kingdom. For each of these ﬁve country pairs, Eichenbaum and
4This literature, as noted in the Introduction, includes Clarida and Gali (1994), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995),
Cushman and Zha (1997), Kim and Roubini (2000), Faust and Rogers (2003), Kim (2005), Scholl and Uhlig (2008),
and Bjornland (2009). Some of these papers also include empirical model speciﬁcations for which the “foreign
country” variables are speciﬁed as weighted averages of variables across a sizeable set of foreign countries, subject to
exogeneity restrictions. Such model speciﬁcations, unlike the model that we will consider in this paper, still cannot
capture simultaneous multi-country adjustments, the hallmark of a genuinely multilateral model.
3Evans (1995) consider a VAR model of the form of
zt = a0 + a1t +
p ￿
s=1
Aszt−s + ut, ut






t FFRt nbrxt qt
￿￿
, (2.2)
with yt denoting U.S. real industrial production, Pt the U.S. consumer price index, y∗
t foreign real
industrial production, R∗
t the foreign nominal short-term interest rate (short-term money market
rate), FFRt the federal funds rate, nbrxt the ratio between U.S. non-borrowed reserves and U.S.
total reserves, and qt the bilateral real exchange rate (in units of U.S. Dollars per one unit of
foreign currency). All elements of zt, except for the interest rates, are in logarithms. Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995) choose the VAR lag order, p, across all country pairs to be equal to six for the
monthly sample from 1974:1 to 1995:5 they are working with. They identify the monetary policy
shock using a Cholesky decomposition involving a Wold recursive ordering of the variables (this
ordering being as in Equation (2.2)), inter alia implying that the Federal Reserve sets the federal
funds rate taking into account the lagged values of all the components of zt as well as the current
values of U.S. industrial production, U.S. prices, foreign industrial production, and the foreign
short-term interest rate (but not the real exchange rate).
As has been widely discussed in the literature on monetary policy VARs, monetary policy shocks
in VAR models measure the unexpected change in a monetary authority’s monetary policy stance





t; zt−s, s ≥ 1
￿
. (2.3)
Such unexpected changes can then be due to, for example, (i) discrepancies between the monetary
authority’s information set at t and the public’s information set at t, the latter being given by It,
(ii) changes in the target values of the variables entering the monetary authority’s monetary policy
decisions, and/or (iii) changes in the parameters of the monetary authority’s decision rule (for (ii)
and (iii) as long as these changes are not reﬂected in It).
Selecting the United States versus Germany based bilateral VAR of Equation (2.1) as one
representative example of the analysis of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Figure 2 shows the impulse
responses for various key variables after a positive federal funds rate shock (that is, a contractionary
U.S. monetary policy shock).5 In regards to exchange rate eﬀects, the bilateral real exchange rate of
the U.S. Dollar relative to the Deutsche Mark (qUSD/DM) overshoots its long-run level with a delay
5To replicate Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), the U.S. monetary policy shock for Figure 2 is set to 50 basis points.
All impulse response standard error bands reported in this paper are 95% error bands, which we obtained using a
bootstrapping algorithm as described in Kilian (1998).
4of about three years, termed the “delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle” in the literature. The
interest rate diﬀerential between the federal funds rate (FFR) and the German short-term interest
rate (RDEU) after the positive federal funds rate shock exhibits a positive diﬀerence for about 15
months. The forward premium, deﬁned as in Scholl and Uhlig (2008) as
ξt = −FFRt + R∗
t + Qt+1 − Qt, (2.4)
(the one period ex post excess return after a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock for a
U.S. investor from borrowing U.S. Dollars, exchanging these to foreign currency at the bilateral
nominal spot exchange rate, Qt, investing in foreign short-term bonds, and then exchanging the
proceeds back to U.S. Dollar after one period),6 for the United States versus Germany country
pair (ξ
USA/DEU
t ) in response to a federal funds rate shock deviates - partially substantially and
signiﬁcantly - from zero for a little more than one year, indicating sizeable arbitrage opportunities in
favor of U.S. bonds. As under conditional uncovered interest parity in response to a monetary policy
shock it would hold that Et (ξt+s) − Et−1 (ξt+s) = 0, s ≥ 0, with Et (·) denoting the conditional
expectations operator, this ﬁnding is termed the “forward premium puzzle” in the literature. Finally
(though not displayed in Figure 2), we can also replicate the Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) ﬁnding
that the impulse responses for U.S. prices display a positive reaction to the positive federal funds
rate shock, rather than following the pattern of a typical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
macroeconomic model with price stickiness, namely of initially failing to respond and after a while
beginning to fall.
It should again be emphasized that the “delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle” and the
“forward premium puzzle” of Clarida and Gali (1994) and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) have
recently been re-aﬃrmed in some key contributions to the literature; see, for example, Kim (2005)
and Scholl and Uhlig (2008). Also, as noted brieﬂy in the Introduction, this empirical evidence has
been viewed as so strong that in the open economy macroeconomics literature various mechanisms
- such as limited information processing, distortion of beliefs, and state-dependent pricing - have
been advanced that can account for the “delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle” and/or the
“forward premium puzzle”; see, for example, Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), Andersen and Beier
(2005), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006), and Landry (2009).
2.2 Further Empirical Work
There is a small number of papers in the literature to date, in particular Cushman and Zha (1997),
Kim and Roubini (2000), Faust and Rogers (2003), and Bjornland (2009), that have argued that
6Note that this deﬁnition of the forward premium involving the ex post future spot exchange rate diﬀers from
that used in other areas of the international macroeconomics literature, which uses the forward exchange rate rather
than the ex post future spot exchange rate.
5there is no empirical support for the “delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle” and/or the
“forward premium puzzle”.
Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000) consider non-U.S. monetary policy
shocks. Exclusively analyzing countries that can arguably be classiﬁed as small open economies,
they consider short-run monetary policy identiﬁcation schemes that - unlike the Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995) Cholesky decomposition based identiﬁcation scheme - do allow for monetary policy
to contemporaneously respond to changes in the exchange rate. Under such an identiﬁcation
scheme, Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000) ﬁnd no empirical support for the
“delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle” and/or the “forward premium puzzle”. The analyses
of Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000) by construction are not applicable to
analyzing the eﬀects of U.S. monetary policy shocks, however, and involve short-run identifying
restrictions that are rather diﬃcult to justify on the basis of macroeconomic theory.
Faust and Rogers (2003) impose sign restrictions on the impact impulse response, and ﬁnd
that the exchange rate impulse response to contractionary U.S. monetary policy shocks is sensitive
to additional - diﬃcult to justify - short-run restrictions required for the identiﬁcation of U.S.
monetary policy shocks, with no robust conclusion about the timing of the appreciation peak
after a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock being possible.7 As argued by Scholl and Uhlig
(2008), however, if one is to impose sign restrictions for the identiﬁcation of the impact impulse
response, one may circumvent having to impose additional - diﬃcult to justify - short-run identifying
restrictions by imposing sign restrictions not only on the contemporaneous, but also on the future
eﬀects of the shocks. Doing so, Scholl and Uhlig (2008) re-aﬃrm the “delayed exchange rate
overshooting puzzle” and the “forward premium puzzle” in response to U.S. monetary policy shocks.
Bjornland (2009), like Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000), constructs a
VAR model of a small open economy. For her VAR, Bjornland (2009) imposes the restriction that
a monetary policy shock cannot have long-run eﬀects on the level of the real exchange rate. This
long-run restriction allows Bjornland (2009) to circumvent having to specify short-run restrictions
on the interaction between monetary policy and the real exchange rate of the type considered by
Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000). Our approach, as we will detail in Section
5, involves using a larger number of long-run identifying restrictions, as is implied by the empirical
evidence, and thus indeed uses as few short-run identifying restrictions as possible. In contrast to
Bjornland (2009), for each country we link our long-run identifying restrictions to empirical evidence
on the number of long-run relations among the variables in our model. Perhaps most important in
regards to comparison of our modelling approach to that of Bjornland (2009), our empirical model
speciﬁcation does not require a small open economy assumption, and we can therefore also consider
7As noted in the Introduction, Faust and Rogers (2003) ﬁnd the “forward premium puzzle”, on the other hand,
to be robustly present for the complete set of short-run restrictions they consider.
6U.S. monetary policy shocks.
3 Multilateral Models: Motivation
In this Section we provide a brief theoretical motivation for working with multilateral rather than
bilateral models when analyzing the exchange rate eﬀects of monetary policy shocks. The model
we will consider in this Section consider is highly stylized, isolating the instantaneous exchange
rate eﬀects of monetary policy shocks in a world of three countries as compared to a world of two
countries, rather than providing an elaborate multilateral dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model that would capture the complete set of variables entering our subsequent empirical analysis.
To keep the exposition in this Section as simple as possible, we suppose that there are at
most three countries, labelled as countries “0”, “1”, and “2”. Also for simplicity, we suppose that
there are at most three types of ﬁnancial assets, bonds of maturity one period denominated in
the currencies of country 0, of country 1, and of country 2, respectively. As we will consider the
exchange rate eﬀects of changes in monetary policy in country 0, only for country 0 we distinguish
between private investors and monetary authorities. For countries 1 and 2, we only model private
investors.8
We will distinguish two model structures: Under model structure “M2”, we only take into
account two of the three countries, namely country 0 as the domestic economy, and the only foreign
economy being given by country 1. Under model structure “M2”, therefore, we drop country 2
from the analysis. Under model structure “M3”, we model all three countries, with country 0 again
being the domestic economy, but now both country 1 and country 2 being foreign economies.
We ﬁrst describe the two-country world, M2. We have the following time t equilibrium condi-
tions for the two bonds in this model structure:
Bi0pt + Bi0gt + Bi1t = 0, i = 0,1, (3.1)
where Bi0pt denotes the time t holdings of the bond denominated in the currency of country i by the
private investors in country 0, Bi0gt the time t holdings of the bond denominated in the currency
of country i by the monetary authorities of country 0, and Bi1t the time t holdings of the bond
denominated in the currency of country i by the investors in country 1. Suppose that the private
investors in country 0 as well as the investors in country 1 use mean-variance analysis to optimize
their portfolio holdings. At the time of solving their portfolio optimization problems, the investors
8While the magnitude of the exchange rate eﬀects of monetary policy changes in country 0 would be diﬀerent if
we captured that central banks in countries 1 and 2 may respond to the monetary policy changes in country 0, our
main point in this Section, namely that the exchange rate eﬀects of monetary policy changes in country 0 will in
general be mis-measured when considering a bilateral model, is not dependent on our assumption of there only being
private investors in countries 1 and 2.
7know the nominal rates of return on the two bonds (the nominal rate of return for country i from t
to t+1 being denoted by Rit), but face uncertainty regarding the one-period-ahead spot exchange
rate between country 0 and country 1, and the one-period-ahead prices in both countries. The






















M2 denoting the weight (under model structure M2) in the time t portfolio of the private
investors in country 0 of the bonds denominated in the currency of country 1, ρ0pt
￿ ￿
M2 denoting the
real rate of return from t to t+1 on the portfolio of the private investors in country 0 (under model
structure M2), γ0p denoting the coeﬃcient of risk aversion of the private investors in country 0,







(R0t − π0,t+1) + ω10pt
￿ ￿
M2 (R1t + ψ01,t+1 − π0,t+1), (3.3)
and with π0,t+1 denoting the rate of inﬂation in country 0 at time t + 1, ψ01,t+1 the rate of appre-







Q01t denoting the time t nominal spot exchange rate between countries 0 and 1 (measured as units
of currency of country 0 per one single unit of currency of country 1). Finally, we suppose that
Et(π0,t+1) = µπ0t, V art (π0,t+1) = σ2
π0, (3.5)
Et (ψ01,t+1) = µψ01t, V art (ψ01,t+1) = σ2
ψ01, (3.6)
and
Covt (π0,t+1,ψ01,t+1) = σπ0,ψ01. (3.7)
Note that for simplicity of exposition we do not specify the dependence of the ﬁrst and second
moments in (3.5) to (3.7) on underlying macroeconomic and ﬁnancial market fundamentals. While
such speciﬁcation would be essential for an analysis characterizing the complete time path of the
exchange rates, our focus here is on the time t appreciation of the currency of country 0 in response
to a contractionary change of the monetary policy stance in country 0 within the two-country
model, in contrast to what it would be in a three-country model to be analyzed below. For this
purpose, little is to be gained from specifying how the ﬁrst and second moments in (3.5) to (3.7)
depend on macroeconomic and ﬁnancial market fundamentals.
8Solving the optimization problem given by (3.2) to (3.7), it is readily established that the time
t optimal portfolio share of the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 by the private












From (3.8), the optimal portfolio share under model structure M2 of the bond denominated in the
currency of country 1 for the private investors in country 0 is a function (i) of the risk-adjusted
excess rate of return of the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 compared to the bond
denominated in the currency of country 0, as well as (ii) the hedge the bond denominated in the
currency of country 1 provides against inﬂation in country 0.
Let us now turn to the three-country world, M3. For the three-country world, we extend
the time t equilibrium conditions in Equation (3.1) to reﬂect that the bonds denominated in the
currencies of countries 0 and 1 can also be held by the investors in country 2, and to incorporate
the time t holdings of the bond denominated in the currency of country 2, Bi2t:
Bi0pt + Bi0gt + Bi1t + Bi2t = 0, i = 0,1,2. (3.9)
We suppose that beyond the private investors in country 0 and the investors in country 1, the
investors in country 2 also use mean-variance analysis to optimize their portfolio holdings. Mirroring
the set-up of the two-country model, at the time of solving their portfolio optimization problems, the
investors know the nominal rates of return on the three bonds, but face uncertainty regarding the
set of one-period-ahead spot exchange rates and the one-period-ahead prices in all three countries.

























M3 denoting the weights (under model structure M3) in the time t portfolio
of the private investors in country 0 of the bonds denominated in the currencies of country 1 and
country 2, respectively, ρ0pt
￿ ￿
M3 denoting the real rate of return from t to t + 1 on the portfolio of
















M3 (Rit + ψ0i,t+1 − π0,t+1),
(3.11)
and with ψ0i,t+1 the rate of appreciation of the currency of country i against the currency of country





B00pt + Q01tB10pt + Q02tB20pt
, i = 1,2, (3.12)
9Q0it denoting the time t nominal spot exchange rate between countries 0 and i (measured as units
of currency of country 0 per one single unit of currency of country i). We suppose in analogy to
(3.6) and (3.7) that
Et (ψ0i,t+1) = µψ0it, V art (ψ0i,t+1) = σ2
ψ0i, i = 1,2, (3.13)
and
Covt (π0,t+1,ψ0i,t+1) = σπ0,ψ0i, i = 1,2, Covt (ψ01,t+1,ψ02,t+1) = σψ01,ψ02.
(3.14)
Solving the optimization problem given by (3.10) to (3.14), it is readily established that the
time t optimal portfolio share of the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 by the private




































From (3.15), the optimal portfolio share of the bond denominated in the currency of country
1 for the private investor in country 0 under model structure M3 is a function (i) of both the
excess rate of return of the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 as well as the excess
rate of return of the bond denominated in the currency of country 2, as well as (ii) the hedge
both the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 as well as the bond denominated in the
currency of country 2 provide against inﬂation in country 0. The optimal portfolio share of the
bond denominated in the currency of country 1 for the private investors in country 0 under model
structure M3will generally only be the same as it is in the two-country model, model structure M2,
if
σψ01,ψ02 = 0. (3.17)
Such an orthogonality restriction on the dynamics of diﬀerent exchange rate pairs is, however,
extremely unlikely to hold in empirical practice.
Also solving under model structure M2 the optimization problem of the investors in country
1, and under model structure M3 the optimization problems of the investors in countries 2 and
3, upon substituting the complete set of optimal portfolio shares into the relevant market clearing
10condition, (Equation (3.1) under model structure M2 and Equation (3.9) under model structure
M3), and then diﬀerentiating the resultant identities under the implicit function theorem with
respect to Q01t and R0t, it can be shown that9
∂Q01t
∂R0t





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
M3
, (3.18)
unless the orthogonality condition of Equation (3.17) holds, which, again, is extremely unlikely to
be the case in empirical practice. Thus, a bilateral analysis of monetary policy changes in country
0 that includes only the variables of countries 0 and 1 will generally be subject to an omitted
variables problem. The variables for country 2 generally need to be included as well. Through
calibration-style exercises, we have established that under reasonable parameterizations of model
structures M2 and M3 the instantaneous bilateral and/or eﬀective exchange rate appreciations for
the currency of country 0 caused by a contractionary monetary policy shock in country 0 may in
the three-country model be either weaker or stronger than in the two-country model. The strength
of the exchange rate eﬀects of a monetary policy change thus seems to be primarily an empirical
question.
Rather than augmenting our simple stylized model to capture frictions that within the model
will lead to exchange rate overshooting, in this paper we restrict ourselves to building and estimating
an empirical model heeding the main insight of Equation (3.18): The exchange rate and forward
premium eﬀects of monetary policy shocks in the presence of more than two countries will generally
be mis-measured in a bilateral (two-country) model. A multilateral model is called for, capturing
the complete spectrum of the relevant cross-country exchange rate correlations.10
4 An Empirical Multilateral Model
4.1 A Global Vector Error Correction Model (GVECM)
A common limitation of the empirical models considered in the previous literature on the exchange
rate eﬀects of monetary policy is that they omit considering the simultaneous nature of the in-
ternational spillover eﬀects that a monetary policy shock will cause. To address this problem, we
work with a Global VAR (GVAR) model as proposed by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004).
Suppose that there are T sample periods, t = 1,2,... ,T, and N + 1 countries, the countries in-
dexed by i = 0,1,2,... ,N. For each country, we wish to model a vector xit of m country-speciﬁc
9The algebraic details are described in a note available from the authors upon request.
10We do not address in this paper the question as to the minimum number of countries that is needed to avoid
sizeable mis-measurement due to an omitted countries bias. The answer to this question is likely to be sample
speciﬁc, and in this paper we simply take the approach of working with a panel of major industrial economies
spanning Northern America, Europe as well as East Asia and the Paciﬁc.









a VAR model in xt obviously would contain ways too many parameters to be estimable unless the
time dimension, T, of each country’s data series would by far exceed the cross-sectional dimension,
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enter the set of equations for country i in unrestricted form, the GVAR model involves a structural







w￿ijx￿jt, with w￿ij = 0 for i = j, & = 1,2,... ,m∗, (4.3)
and where
￿N
j=0 w￿ij = 1, for all relevant & and all i, the weights w￿ij reﬂecting the economic
importance of country j for country i.11 The GVAR model for country i is then given by














where dt is a q×1 dimensional vector of observed common factors. The vectors of country-speciﬁc
foreign variables x∗
i,t−s account for direct spillovers across countries and may also proxy the inﬂuence
of unobserved common factors across countries. The weights w￿ij entering the construction of x∗
i,t−s
capture the diﬀerential eﬀects that diﬀerent foreign countries have on domestic economy variables,
and impose the restriction that the magnitude of the spillovers from a foreign economy onto the
domestic economy is in proportion to the weighting scheme. The foreign variables and the observed
common factors in dt in Equation (4.4) are treated as weakly exogenous.
In order to distinguish between temporary and permanent shocks, we re-write Equation (4.4)
in error-correction format, rendering the Global Vector Error Correction Model (GVECM):
∆xit = ai0 + ai1t + Πizi,t−1 +
p−1 ￿
s=1






















11In this paper, we will use trade weights to construct the w￿ij’s. To capture a separate ﬁnancial market channel
of cross-country spillovers, one might like to (also) consider ﬁnancial capital ﬂow based weights, in particular for
ﬁnancial market variables. As the necessary broad set of bilateral data on ﬁnancial capital ﬂow based weights at



























The matrix Πi may be decomposed as Πi = αiβ￿
i, where βi is the matrix of cointegrating relations.
It would be an enormous task to simultaneously estimate a system in ∆xt, with each ∆xit
generated by Equation (4.5). The GVECM can, however, be readily estimated on a country-by






→ 0 as N → ∞, for all i ￿= j, & and m. (4.9)
The condition in Equation (4.9), established by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004), may be
viewed as weakening one of Zellner’s (1962) conditions under which a seemingly unrelated equation
system can be estimated on an equation-by-equation basis, namely if the variance-covariance matrix
of the system is diagonal. The condition in Equation (4.9) requires that the cross-country inter-
dependencies asymptotically are captured through the foreign variables and the observed common
factors in dt.12
Upon country-by-country estimation of the GVECM - which can be accomplished using the
methodology of Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2000) - for an impulse reponse analysis it is necessary
to obtain the implied global solution for xt.13 To obtain the global solution in levels form, note
that Equation (4.4) can also be re-written as
























From Equation (4.3), it is readily seen that
yit = Wixt, (4.12)
12If the foreign variables and the observed common factors in dt in Equation (4.4) cannot be treated as weakly
exogenous, the GVECM can still be estimated on a country-by-country basis, but the equation system for country i





13Impulse reponse analysis cannot be carried out on the basis of the GVECM representation in Equation (4.5),
as any innovation in uit in general causes responses of all elements of xt, and thus the foreign variables entering
Equation (4.5) cannot be modelled as being unaﬀected by innovations in uit.
13for an appropriately deﬁned weighting and selection matrix Wi. By stacking Equation (4.10) across
all i, the resultant multilateral (“global”) model can be re-written as






























































    

, and ut =








    

. (4.15)
The matrix G can in general be expected to be of full rank, in which case the global solution in
levels form is given by






Υsdt−s + G−1ut. (4.16)
The global solution in Equation (4.16) indeed is a VAR for the union of all countries’ sets of
domestic variables. The key feature of the GVAR/GVECM framework is that it allows to estimate
Equation (4.16) indirectly on a country-by-country basis, allowing for the consideration of a larger
number of countries and richer country-speciﬁc model formulations than would ever be feasible if
it was attempted to estimate Equation (4.16) directly.
4.2 GVECM Variables and Data
We consider the sample period from January 1978 to December 2006 for nine industrial countries:
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the







where (in all cases for country i at time t) yit denotes the logarithm of real industrial production,
Pit the logarithm of the consumer price index, Rm
it the monetary policy indicator (in fractions), Rit
the short-term nominal interest rate (typically a three-months treasury-bill type rate, in fractions),












each foreign variable deﬁned as in Equation (4.3). Note that we do not construct country-speciﬁc
foreign variables for the monetary policy indicator, since for each country the indicator reﬂects
diﬀerent variables (we will discuss our choice of the monetary policy indicators in Section 5).
Following most of the GVAR literature, the weights we use for the construction of the foreign
variables and the eﬀective exchange rates are average trade weights based on a middle period in
the sample (namely, from January 1991 to December 1993).
The observed common factor dt we specify to be the logarithm of spot world market oil prices
and of a commodity price index for agricultural raw materials.
While it would, of course, be of interest to use a real-time database for our empirical analysis,
due to lack of the required real-time databases for the majority of the countries in our sample,
our data incorporates all data revisions that have been made to date since initial release of the
data. This is consistent with all of the previous empirical papers on the exchange rate eﬀects of
monetary policy shocks as cited in the Introduction and in Section 2. It should also be noted
that the ﬁndings of Croushore and Evans (2006) suggest that key results regarding the eﬀects of
U.S. monetary policy shocks are the same when real-time data sets are used as when data sets
incorporating data revisions are used.
5 Measuring Monetary Policy Shocks
5.1 Monetary Policy Indicators
Let us turn to the issue of measuring the monetary policy shock. First, we need to choose the
indicators that for each country seem to best measure the monetary policy stance. It has been widely
recognized in the literature that monetary aggregates do not represent satisfactory measures of the
monetary policy stance, as changes of monetary aggregates involve various non-policy inﬂuences
and reﬂect both changes of money demand and money supply.14 Hence we focus on other variables
such as short-term interest rates and reserve ratios. Let us brieﬂy discuss our choices for each
country.
For the United States, we consider two alternatives: the federal funds rate (FFR) and the ratio
between non-borrowed reserves and total reserves (nbrx). The FFR has been the Federal Reserve’s
operating target for most of our sample period; announcing the federal funds target rate has been a
major policy signal channel for the Federal Reserve. Thus we believe that the FFR closely reﬂects
14See, for example, Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
15the Federal Reserve’s policy stance. This is also supported by empirical evidence. Bernanke and
Mihov (1998), for example, conclude that it seems best to measure the Federal Reserve’s monetary
policy stance using the FFR prior to 1979 and nbrx from 1979 to 1982, and either FFR or nbrx
for more recent periods. Therefore, we choose the FFR for our default analysis, and augment our
analysis with nbrx for robustness checks.
For Canada, it appears that the Bank of Canada’s overnight rate contains much of the relevant
information about the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy stance. The Bank of Canada announces
the target rate for the overnight rate to send policy signals (Armour, Engert, and Fung, 1996).
According to the analysis of Armour, Engert, and Fung (1996), the path of the overnight rate is
consistent with the policy record of the Bank of Canada from the 1970s, and is preferable compared
to use of other alternatives such as the 90-days paper rate term spread (the 90-days paper rate
minus the yield on ten-years or longer maturity Canadian government bonds). Therefore, we choose
the overnight rate as the indicator of Canadian monetary policy.
For the European countries France, Germany, and Italy, as ﬁrst candidates for measures of
the monetary policy stance we consider money market rates as the target rates steered by their
respective central banks. Before 1999, unlike the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada that
sent signals mainly through announcements of target rates, these European countries’ central banks
used various strategies to signal their monetary policy stance, including tender rates in open market
operations, quantity signals, and standing facilities. The Bank of France used repurchases of
government and private claims as its major operation; important signals were sent via various
repurchase rates. Even among the tender rates, no single rate seems to have adequately captured
the complete monetary policy stance of the Bank of France, though. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s
lombard rate, constituting an upper bound for German money market rates, was an important
signal for German monetary policy for many years. The lombard rate and the overnight call rate
are identiﬁed as useful measures of the Bundesbank’s monetary policy stance in Bernanke and
Mihov (1997) using data before 1990. From the 1990s on, standing facilities have accounted for
less and less of the re-ﬁnancing, and the day-to-day call money market rate seems to be a more
appropriate measure of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s monetary policy stance (Brueggemann, 2003).
For Italy, in addition to the repurchase rates, the discount window has been conveying the long-
term monetary policy stance of the Bank of Italy. De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1999) argue that
the repurchase agreement rate and the overnight rate have been strong substitutes, and that the
Bank of Italy has been targeting the overnight interbank loan rate. Given these considerations,
instead of using for France, Germany, and Italy variables that likely reﬂect only a limited amount
of information about monetary policy operations, we prefer to use for the time period prior to
the establishment of the European Central Bank country-speciﬁc overnight money market rates.
For the time period following the introduction of a common monetary policy for the Euro area in
16January 1999, we use the European Overnight Index Average (EONIA) as the monetary policy
indicator for France, Germany, and Italy, as the European Central Bank appears to have a strong
interest in steering it.
For the United Kingdom, our choice is the “oﬃcial bank rate”. The “oﬃcial bank rate” includes
all the rates that the Bank of England has sequentially used since 1978.15
For Japan, we consider the overnight call rate as our primary candidate for the monetary policy
indicator for the Bank of Japan, as it was the operating target before 2001 and then again after
2006. Between 2001 and 2006, the Bank of Japan primarily targeted the quantity of bank reserves
(for example, McCallum, 2003). Using the overnight call rate as the monetary policy indicator,
Miyao (2002) ﬁnds plausible eﬀects for apparent changes in the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy
stance.
For Australia, we use the oﬃcial cash rate; the target for the oﬃcial cash rate appears to be a
reasonable measure of the Reserve Bank of Australia’s monetary policy intentions.16 The Reserve
Bank of New Zealand targeted settlement cash balances until 1999, and there were no oﬃcially
set or targeted interest rates during that time period. In March 1999, the oﬃcial cash rate was
introduced to help meet the inﬂation target.17 We therefore use a combination of the discount rate
prior to 1999 and the oﬃcial cash rate thereafter as our monetary policy indicator for the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand.
5.2 Identiﬁcation of Monetary Policy Shocks in the Global Vector Error Cor-
rection Model
The structural form of the Global Vector Error Correction Model (GVECM) for country i from
Equation (4.5) can be represented as




+Axx,iΓi∆￿ zit + εxit, εxit
iid. (for t)
∼ (0, Σεxi), (5.1)
with the reduced form shocks in uit are related to the structural shocks in εxit as uit = A−1
xx,iεxit.
Let us suppose that the processes for the foreign variables in x∗
it and the common factors in dt are
given by
∆￿ zit = bi0 +
p−1 ￿
s=1
Θis∆￿ zi,t−s + ε￿ zit, ε￿ zit
i.i.d. (for t)
∼ (0, Σε￿ zi). (5.2)










. We need to identify the m2 elements in Axx,i. As is standard
in the literature, we normalize E(εxitε￿











xx,i. This orthogonality condition provides m(m+1)/2 restrictions for identiﬁcation.
We thus still need an additional m(m − 1)/2 restrictions to just-identify A0,xx,i.
Typical restrictions considered in the VAR literature are to impose m(m − 1)/2 short-run
(contemporaneous) restrictions, such as by restricting the Axx,i matrix to be lower triangular, as
in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). In this case, a strong causal ordering assumption for the model
variables is made, rendering the contemporaneous variable interaction structure recursive. Such a
recursive structure from the perspective of macroeconomic theory.seems unlikely to hold. Impulse
responses from such a recursive structure based identiﬁcation scheme, known as orthogonalized
impulse reponses, also often are sensitive to the ordering of the variables.
In our GVECM, the cointegrating relationships provide us with useful information for the iden-
tiﬁcation of the structural shocks, enabling us to work with identifying assumptions that from the
perspective of macroeconomic theory are considerably weaker than those underlying orthogonalized
impulse reponses.18 We stack Equations (5.1) and (5.2) to obtain
Ai∆zit = ci0 + ci1t + ￿ Πizi,t−1 +
p−1 ￿
s=1



































and k = m + m∗ + q. Suppose that we have r cointegrating relationships among the total of k
variables in zit. We can then represent {zit} as








18Faust and Leeper (1997) in the context of a bivariate VAR argue against a long-run identiﬁcation scheme with
one transitory and one permanent shock, as such a scheme may lead to misidentiﬁcation when the true empirical
model features a larger number of shocks than the estimated model. In line with the arguments in Pagan and
Pesaran (2008), we view long-run identifying restrictions not just as weaker than corresponding short-run restrictions
from the perspective of macroeconomic theory, but also as recognizing existing properties of a dynamic model with
cointegrating relations. Furthermore, there is a wealth of econometric evidence (much of it reviewed, for example, in
Luetkepohl, 2007), that for the type of data sample we are working with in this paper, such models can be estimated
with a satisfactory degree of reliability.




i⊥, with ￿ α￿
i⊥￿ αi = 0 and β
￿
iβi⊥ = 0, so that Ci￿ αi = 0k×r
and β
￿
iCi = 0r×k; zi0 is an initialization of {zit}. It is well known (for a review, see, for example,
Pesaran, Shin, and Smith, 2000) that
￿t
s=1 uis is a vector of random walks, and that C∗
is is
absolutely summable, with C∗
is converging to the zero matrix as s → ∞. Therefore, the long-run
eﬀects of innovations to uit are fully captured through common trend component Ci
￿t
s=1 uis. As
Ci has rank k − r, there are k − r stochastic trends that are driving the system in zit. Moving
from a representation involving the reduced form disturbances in uit to one involving the structural
disturbances in εit, Equation (5.6) can be re-written as


























−1 + Cx￿ z,i
C￿ zx,iA−1
xx,i −C￿ zx,i (Axx,iΓi)
−1 + C￿ z￿ z,i
￿
. (5.8)
Clearly, Ai is non-singular, and thus CiA−1
i is of rank k − r, that is, only k − r structural shocks
have long-run eﬀects on the total of k variables in zit. If the foreign variables in x∗
it and the common
factors in dt are weakly exogenous I(1) processes, and there are no cointegrating relations among
these, then the shocks to these variables will be among those having long-run eﬀects.
For most of the empirical analysis of this paper, we will focus on the eﬀects of U.S. monetary
policy shocks. For the U.S., we ﬁnd that there are three cointegrating relations. Let us thus discuss
the case of r = 3 in more detail. It would seem a strong restriction to impose that the structural
shocks to industrial production and to prices have no long-run eﬀects. It seems very reasonable,
however, to impose that the structural shocks to the monetary policy indicator, to the short-term
interest rate, and to the eﬀective nominal exchange rate have no long-run eﬀects. This assumption
renders the columns of Cxx,iA−1
xx,i that measure the long-run eﬀects of these shocks equal to zero
vectors, reﬂecting that these shocks only have transitory eﬀects. Placing the structural shocks to
the monetary policy indicator, the short-term interest rate, and the eﬀective nominal exchange rate




         

εy εP εRm εR εQ
y ∗ ∗ 0 0 0
P ∗ ∗ 0 0 0
Rm ∗ ∗ 0 0 0
R ∗ ∗ 0 0 0
Q ∗ ∗ 0 0 0

         

. (5.9)
19The zeros in the last three columns of Cxx,iA−1
xx,i reﬂect that we have six (in general r(m − r))
linearly independent long-run restrictions for structural shock identiﬁcation. Therefore, we now
only need four (in general m(m−1)/2−r(m−r)) additional restrictions for a just-identiﬁed Axx,i
matrix. As the ﬁrst additional restriction, we assume that the shocks to consumer prices do not




         

εy εP εRm εR εQ
y ∗ 0 0 0 0
P ∗ ∗ 0 0 0
Rm ∗ ∗ 0 0 0
R ∗ ∗ 0 0 0
Q ∗ ∗ 0 0 0

         

. (5.10)
Observing the local uniqueness condition when solving for Axx,i,19 we are left with having to impose
three short-run restrictions to complete just-identiﬁcation of Axx,i. It appears reasonable to impose
that (i) real industrial production does not contemporaneously respond to monetary policy indica-
tor and short-term interest rate shocks, and that (ii) consumer prices do not contemporaneously
respond to short-term interest rate shocks:
Axx,i =

         

εy εP εRm εR εQ
y ∗ ∗ 0 0 ∗
P ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 ∗
Rm ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
R ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Q ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗

         

. (5.11)
Having identiﬁed the U.S. structural monetary policy shock, we can move to the global solution
and the impulse response functions. Recalling the global solution given by Equation (4.16), we ﬁrst
stack it in companion form,
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
, (5.13)
19See, for example, Luetkepohl (2007) for a discussion of the local uniqueness condition.
20￿ H =

       

G−1H1 G−1H2 ··· G−1Hp−1 G−1Hp
I(N+1)m 0(N+1)m ··· 0(N+1)m 0(N+1)m
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       

, (5.15)
where we take the shock vector εt to be composed of the U.S. structural shocks and reduced form
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A−1
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0m 0m 0m ··· Im

       

. (5.17)
We should note that identifying the complete set of structural shocks across all countries would
result in us having to impose more than 2,000 parameter restrictions on the global solution. We
therefore choose to restrict structural identiﬁcation to the U.S. component of the GVECM, including
in particular the U.S. monetary policy shock. Doing so, we actually can also allow for the U.S.
structural monetary policy shock to be correlated with any of the reduced form shocks in any of
the other countries, and do not need to impose zero contemporaneous impact restrictions for any
of the U.S. structural shocks on other countries’ variables. On this count, we let the data speak
freely.20 The s-period ahead global impulse response for a U.S. structural monetary policy shock
can now be computed as







20In Section 7, we will nevertheless also document the robustness of our main empirical ﬁndings to imposing
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
, (5.19)
with ei being the selection vector detailing the location of the U.S. monetary policy shock in the
vector εt.
6 Empirical Results
We consider the eﬀects of a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock, deﬁned in this Section as a
one-standard deviation positive innovation of the federal funds rate, and identiﬁed as discussed in
Section 5. All results in this Section are based on allowing for three cointegrating relations among
the domestic and foreign variables for the United States block of the GVECM, as is empirically
supported by unit root and cointegration rank tests.21
A one-standard deviation positive shock to the federal funds rate represents an almost immediate
increase of the federal funds rate of about 30 basis points, before the federal funds rate falls gradually
back to its steady state level within about two years (see Figure 3). The other countries’ monetary
policy indicators do barely respond to the U.S. shock, except for Canada, which features a positive
increase in the overnight rate for the ﬁrst 18 months. This is in contrast to previous empirical
studies using bilateral settings, which have found positive and signiﬁcant responses for foreign
countries’ monetary policy indicators in response to U.S. monetary policy shocks.
The eﬀects for a consistent cross-country measure of short-term interest rates, three-month bond
returns, are by and large similar to those for the monetary policy indicator, with the exception
of Canada: The response of Canadian short-term interest rates to a U.S. monetary policy shock
is insigniﬁcant. Therefore, the U.S. monetary policy shock for the majority of countries in our
panel leads to a signiﬁcant and relatively persistent increase in the spread between U.S. and foreign
interest rates. (Figure 4.)
Turning to the nominal and real eﬀective exchange rates, we ﬁnd that the contractionary U.S.
monetary policy shock leads to immediate overshooting of the U.S. Dollar nominal and real eﬀective
exchange rates (Figures 5 and 6). Namely, the peak of the exchange rate appreciation occurs in the
second month after the federal funds rate shock, before the U.S. Dollar gradually depreciates back
to its long-run PPP level within about two and half years. This is in line with standard overshooting
21The unit root and cointegration test results (as well as test results for weak exogeneity) are documented in an
appendix available from the authors upon request.
22theory and in contrast to most of the previous empirical ﬁndings. There is no delayed overshooting
puzzle for the U.S. Dollar eﬀective exchange rate after a domestic contractionary monetary policy
shock. The appreciation at the peak is about 0.9 percent for both the nominal and real U.S.
Dollar eﬀective exchange rates. The majority of the other countries’ nominal eﬀective exchange
rates respond to the contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock with a small, often insigniﬁcant
depreciation (the depreciation is statistically signiﬁcant for the Canadian Dollar for about six
months, the Japanese Yen for about 18 months, and for the Pound Sterling for about three months.
The real eﬀective exchange rates behave very similar to the nominal ones.
With regards to the forward premium’s response to a contractionary U.S. monetary policy
shock, Figure 7 provides these impulse responses. For the U.S. forward premium, except for the
ﬁrst two months, we do not observe a signiﬁcant conditional short-run deviation from uncovered
interest parity. Our ﬁnding that there is no signiﬁcant conditional deviation from uncovered interest
parity again is in contrast to most of the previous empirical work. For the other countries in our
panel, these do not feature persistently signiﬁcant short-run forward premia either. Only for the
ﬁrst three to six months there are small but signiﬁcant forward premia (of the opposite sign as for
the United States) for France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.
Figure 8 graphs the impulse responses for the consumer price indices. After a contractionary
U.S. monetary policy shock, the consumer price index in the U.S. responds with an increase of
about 0.025 percent, which is followed by a gradual fall, until it reaches the long-run response of
about −0.1 percent. Only the long-run response is signiﬁcant. For the other countries, we do not
ﬁnd signiﬁcant short-run increases of the consumer price indices, though over longer horizons the
impulse responses for these price indices fall as well, typically by rather small magnitudes.
Figure 9 summarizes the main ﬁndings conveyed by the impulse responses presented so far:
For our GVECM, unlike the Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) results as an example of the typical
previous empirical ﬁndings, there is no delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle (but rather an
almost immediate peak appreciation in response to a U.S. contractionary monetary policy shock
that is in line with sticky price macroeconomic models), and there is (except for the ﬁrst two
months after the shock) no signiﬁcant conditional deviation from uncovered interest parity, again
consistent with sticky price macroeconomic models.
It is important to note that our ﬁndings of exchange rate and forward premium adjustment paths
consistent with conditional uncovered interest parity and a long-run return to purchasing power
parity equilibrium in response to a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock are not implied
by ﬁndings in favor of uncovered interest parity and/or purchasing power parity as unconditional
long-run relationships. Table 1 provides the three U.S. cointegration relations. Table 2 provides
tests for uncovered interest parity and purchasing power parity as long-run relationships within
our GVECM. Note that the joint validity of the uncovered interest parity and purchasing power
23parity hypotheses is rejected for all nine countries in our sample, and that uncovered interest parity
and purchasing power parity individually also are rejected for almost all countries. It is therefore
critical to distinguish between diﬀerent sources of shocks, a ﬁnding that again is consistent with
the predicitions of the new open economy macroeconomics literature, for example Bergin (2006).
While for space reasons we do not document so in elaborate detail, these results are robust
to considerations such as modiﬁcation of our lag length selection criteria (our default results are
based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion based lag orders) as well as the addition of dummy variables
to account for the monetary policy change for some of the European countries in 1999, and to
account for German re-uniﬁcation in 1990. The results are furthermore robust to using a broader
commodity price index (rather than spot oil prices) as a common factor in the GVECM.
Finally, as can be seen from Figure 10, the GVAR/GVECM based results indicate that in re-
sponse to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the countries other than the United States,22
in virtually all cases either the bilateral and eﬀective real U.S. Dollar exchange rates either depre-
ciate signiﬁcantly for a period of between three and 18 months (Canada, Germany, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom), or exhibit no signiﬁcant reaction.
7 Model Comparisons and Counterfactual Analysis
Clearly, the Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) speciﬁcation and our GVECM speciﬁcation diﬀer beyond
considering bilateral (two-country) versus multilateral (multi-country) settings in several other
aspects also:
(i) data sets: relative to Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), we have an extended data set available;
(ii) variable speciﬁcation: our GVECM includes a larger number of foreign variables than accounted
for by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995);
(iii) cointegrating relations: Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) use a level VAR, while our GVECM
imposes restrictions implied by empirically supported cointegrating relations;
(iv) monetary policy shock identiﬁcation: our GVECM exploits a combination of long- and short-
run restrictions for identiﬁcation purposes, whereas Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) identify mon-
etary policy shocks based on short-run restrictions imposing a recursive ordering of the model
variables (the Cholesky decomposition).
Therefore, in order to explore the reasons underlying the remarkable diﬀerences between our
empirical ﬁndings of Section 6 and those of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), we conduct a step-by-
step “counterfactual analysis”.
In the ﬁrst step of this counterfactual analysis, we use our sample from January 1978 to De-
cember 2006 to replicate Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), namely, we estimate a bilateral VAR
22A note describing our identiﬁcation procedure for monetary policy shocks in countries for which the number of
cointegrating relations is, unlike for the U.S., not equal to three, is available from the authors upon request.




t FFRt nbrxt qt
￿
,
where yt denotes U.S. real industrial production, Pt the U.S. consumer price index, y∗
t German real
industrial production, R∗
t German short-term interest rates, FFRt the federal funds rate as the
U.S. monetary policy indicator, nbrxt the ratio between U.S. non-borrowed reserves and U.S. total
reserves, and qt the bilateral real exchange rate between the U.S. Dollar and the Deutsche Mark.
The lag order is chosen to be six in order to be consistent with Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). The
U.S. monetary policy shock is identiﬁed using the Cholesky decomposition of the variables (ordered
as above), which implies that the Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate taking into account
the lagged values of all variables as well as the current value of U.S. industrial production, the U.S.
consumer prices, German industrial production, and German short-term interest rates. To facili-
tate comparison with Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), the U.S. monetary policy shock throughout
our counterfactual analysis in this Section is set to 50 basis points, rather than to one standard
deviation, as it was for Figures 3 to 8, Figure 9 (iii) and Figure 10. Figure 11a shows that when
incorporating more recent data than Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) could, the peak of the real U.S.
Dollar/Deutsche Mark exchange rate impulse response occurs about 10 months after the shock,
and thus the delay of overshooting is shorter than found by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). The
federal funds rate and German short-term interest rates behave similarly as in Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995), and a signiﬁcant instantaneous deviation of about 0.8 percent from uncovered in-
terest parity is observed, with signiﬁcance of this conditional uncovered interest parity deviation
holding for up to nine months. Overall, therefore, while the results in the extended sample suggest
a less pronounced delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle than in the original Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995) sample, both the delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle and the forward premium
puzzle are not addressed by updating of the Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) sample.
Our next step is to investigate how the key empirical results would change if rather than using
German variables we used weighted foreign variables for the U.S. (as well as the full sample of data),
within the VAR framework of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). Therefore, we adapt the Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995) VAR speciﬁcation to contain the same domestic and foreign variables as we use









(Note that the starred variables now again denote the weighted sums of the corresponding U.S.
variables across all eight countries in our panel foreign to the U.S., instead of referring to one
speciﬁc foreign country (Germany in the previous step of our counterfactual analysis).) Compared
to Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), we add the foreign consumer price index and the U.S. short-term
interest rate Rt, replace the real bilateral U.S. Dollar versus Deutsche Mark exchange rate with
the nominal eﬀective U.S. Dollar exchange rate (Q∗
t rather than qt), and drop the ratio between
U.S. non-borrowed reserves and U.S. total reserves, nbrxt. We continue to keep the Cholesky
25decomposition based identiﬁcation scheme of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), with the variable
ordering as noted in Equation (7.1)). While this is not a truly multilateral speciﬁcation yet,
it captures a larger number of foreign variables than the original Eichenbaum and Evans (1995)
speciﬁcation, and may address issues of potentially peculiar results for speciﬁc country pairs. Figure
11b provides the impulse responses. The nominal and real eﬀective U.S. Dollar exchange rates
still display delayed overshooting, with the peak of the appreciation of the U.S. Dollar occurring
approximately 24 to 30 months after the federal funds rate shock. The forward premium exhibits an
approximately 0.4 percent deviation from uncovered interest parity right after the U.S. monetary
policy shock, before the forward premium returns to zero within about 12 months. Augmenting
the bilateral VAR of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) to capture all variables entering the United
States component of our GVECM thus still resolves neither the delayed exchange rate overshooting
puzzle nor the forward premium puzzle.
The third step of our counterfactual analysis is to move from the VAR setting to the truly
multilateral GVAR setting, specifying separate models for all nine countries in our panel. For














. The U.S. monetary policy shock is identiﬁed in
the United States portion of the GVAR using a Wold ordering, and is then incorporated into the
global solution. In this analysis, only the order of the domestic variables matters, and we order
these as yit, Pit, Rm
it, Rit, and Qit. A major diﬀerence in empirical results that we obtain for the
Cholesky decomposition-based GVAR as compared to the models considered in the ﬁrst two steps
of our counterfactual analysis is that after a U.S. monetary policy shock, the German short-term
interest rate displays no signiﬁcant response (see Figure 11c). The non-GVAR setting appears to
overstate the response of German interest rates to U.S. monetary policy shocks. In addition, the
federal funds rate falls back to its original levels within 14 months, a shorter adjustment phase
than in the bilateral models. The peak responses of the U.S. Dollar nominal and real eﬀective
exchange rates occur in the second month after the U.S. monetary policy shock, but except for
the ﬁrst two months these responses are insigniﬁcant, and for all months of very small magnitude.
The contemporaneous eﬀective forward premium’s response is about −0.3 percent, the deviations
from uncovered interest parity now being smaller and less persistent than for the bilateral models,
with signiﬁcant responses occurring only for the ﬁrst four or so months. Figure 11d reports results
for the impulse responses implied by this set-up for bilateral U.S. Dollar versus Deutsche Mark
nominal and real exchange rates, as well as bilateral forward premia between the United States
and Germany. The peak of the overshooting for the bilateral rates occurs with a signiﬁcant delay
of about 12 months only. The forward premium is signiﬁcant in favor of U.S. bonds for about
nine months. Overall, therefore, working with a multilateral GVAR model without considering
long-run cointegration based monetary policy shock identiﬁcation, there still is evidence for the
26delayed exchange rate overshooting and forward premium puzzles. The lack of signiﬁcance of the
U.S. Dollar nominal and real eﬀective exchange rate impulse responses cast, however, doubt on the
set-up of a GVAR with the U.S. monetary policy shock being identiﬁed on the basis of a Cholesky
decomposition.
In the fourth step of our counterfactual analysis, we capture the long-run cointegrating relations
of our GVECM set-up, but still use the Cholesky decomposition based monetary policy shock
identiﬁcation of the previous steps of our counterfactual analysis. The results are displayed in
Figures 11e and 11f. As for the GVAR results, the German short-term interest rate does not
display a signiﬁcant reaction to the U.S. monetary policy shock. The U.S. Dollar eﬀective nominal
and real exchange rates show small short-term appreciation, and then depreciate. For the U.S.
Dollar versus Deutsche Mark bilateral nominal and real exchange rates implied by this set-up,
we observe a similar small short-run appreciation. The forward premium impulse responses, both
measured as eﬀective forward premia for the United States and as bilateral forward premia for the
United States relative to Germany, indicate forward premia in favor of U.S. bonds for about four
months. The mostly insigniﬁcant nominal and real depreciation of the U.S. Dollar in response to
a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock obtained in the GVECM setting of this step suggests
that the Cholesky decomposition based shock identiﬁcation is rather problematic when applied to
a model containing long-run restrictions.
For the ﬁfth step of our counterfactual analysis, we then move to our GVECM set-up with
identiﬁcation restrictions similar to those in Sections 5 and 6, namely cointegration-based long-
run restrictions augmented by as few short-run identiﬁcation restrictions as necessary, but now -
unlike in Sections 5 and 6 - we impose cross-country orthogonality of the monetary policy shocks.
As Figure 11g shows, for the impulse responses for the nominal and real eﬀective U.S. Dollar
exchange rates this yields very similar results as we had obtained in Section 6. (The impulse
responses in Figures 11i and 11j are obtained using our methodology of Sections 5 and 6, except
that they are plotted for a U.S. contractionary monetary policy shock of 50 basis points, as in the
previous steps of the counterfactual analysis in this Section.) Also, the impulse response for the
eﬀective U.S. forward premium is very similar to the one we had obtained in Section 6. While there
are quantitative diﬀerences for the bilateral exchange rate and forward premium responses across
the two settings of cross-country orthogonality of the monetary policy shocks being imposed/not
imposed, and the results are stronger when cross-country orthogonality of the monetary policy
shocks is not imposed (which also is our prefered speciﬁcation), for the analysis involving eﬀective
rates assumptions regarding the presence of cross-country correlation of shocks abroad with U.S.
monetary policy shocks clearly are not a factor for the results.
Overall, the ﬁndings of our counterfactual analysis strongly suggest that both (i) our accounting
for multilateral (rather than just bilateral) cross-country adjustment in response to monetary policy
27shocks, and (ii) our taking advantage of the identifying restrictions for monetary policy shocks
implied by long-run relations between the macroeconomic variables under consideration, are of
critical relevance in us being able to provide evidence that there is neither a delayed exchange rate
overshooting puzzle nor a forward premium puzzle in the adjustment of U.S. Dollar nominal and
real exchange rates and forward premia in response to U.S. monetary policy shocks.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have re-considered the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates and
forward premia. In the recent empirical literature these eﬀects have been described as puzzling, in
that they would include delayed overshooting of the exchange rate as well as persistent deviations
from uncovered interest parity. We have constructed an empirical model that in particular (i) allows
for simultaneous multi-country adjustments in response to monetary policy shocks, and (ii) takes
advantage of the identifying restrictions for monetary policy shocks implied by long-run relations
between the macroeconomic variables under consideration. Using monthly data from 1978 to 2006
for a panel of nine industrial economies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New
Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States), we have found that U.S. Dollar eﬀective and
bilateral real exchange rates appreciate almost on impact after a contractionary U.S. monetary
policy shock, and that there is no delay in the overshooting of the U.S. Dollar. Furthermore, there
is no persistent signiﬁcant forward premium and the price puzzle is at most weakly present. These
results are consistent with the real exchange rate eﬀects of monetary policy shocks in sticky price
open economy macroeconomic models, though the results of this paper also suggest that the latter
models should be speciﬁed so as to capture simultaneous multi-country adjustments to shocks.
28Appendix A: Data Definitions and Sources 
The following are the data definitions and sources for the variables used in the empirical analysis of the paper: 
Variable  Description  Source  Notes 




The series for Australia, France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States were not available in seasonally adjusted form from the IFS, 
and were seasonally adjusted by the authors. 
P Index of consumer 
prices
IFS  The price series for Australia and New Zealand involve authors’ 




IFS and OECD  The effective exchange rates were computed by the authors 
combining bilateral nominal exchange rates from the IFS with bilateral 
import and export data for the sample of nine countries from the 
OECD. The effective exchange rates are not the multilateral effective 
nominal exchange rates reported in the IFS. 
P
o Spot world market oil 
price
Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis 
P
c Commodity price 





m Description  Source
Australia  Official cash rate  Australian Reserve Bank 
Canada  Bank of Canada overnight rate  IFS 
France  Until December 1998: overnight money market rate; from January 1999: EONIA  IFS 
Germany  Until December 1998: overnight money market rate; from January 1999: EONIA  IFS 
Italy  Until December 1998: overnight money market rate; from January 1999: EONIA  IFS 
Japan  Overnight call rate  IFS 
New Zealand  Until December 1998: discount rate; from January 1999: official cash rate  IFS 
United Kingdom  Official bank rate  Bank of England 
United States  Federal funds rate  IFS 
Variable: R
s Description  Source  Notes
Australia  Treasury bill rate / 90 days 
bank bill rate 
IFS  Until May 2002: treasury bill rate; from June 2002: 90 days bank bill 
rate (no observations on treasury bill rate). 
Canada  Treasury bill rate  IFS   
France  Treasury bill rate / EU 
refinancing rate 
IFS  Until September 2004: treasury bill rate; from October 2004: EU 
refinancing rate (no observations on treasury bill rate). 
Germany  Treasury bill rate  IFS   
Italy  Treasury bill rate  IFS   
Japan  2 months treasury bill rate / 
89-90 days domestic 
certificate rate 
Bank of Japan  Until December 1995: 2 months treasury bill rate; from January 
1996: 89-90 days domestic certificate rate. 
New Zealand  New issue 3 months bill rate / 
90 days bank bill rate 
IFS / Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand 
Until December 1984: new issue 3 months bill rate; from January 
1985: 90 days bank bill rate (no observations on 3 months bill rate). 
United Kingdom  3 months treasury bill rate  Bank of England   
United States  Treasury bill rate  IFS   Appendix B: Cointegrating Relations for the United States, and Tests for Long-Run Uncovered 
Interest and Purchasing Power Parity for All Countries 
Cointegrating Vectors for the United States Component of the GVECM 
Cointegrating 
Relation #1  ( )
* * * *
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.79 1.89 0.53   3.92 9.18 1.13 0.45 0.18 ~ 0 ;
m s o c
t t t t t t t t t t t t y P R R Q y P R Q P P I − − − − − − − − − − − + + + − − + − + − + +
Cointegrating 
Relation #2 ( )
* * * *
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.56 0.81 0.22   0.76 3.12 0.41 0.12 0.05 ~ 0 ;
m s o c
t t t t t t t t t t t t y P R R Q y P R Q P P I − − − − − − − − − − − − + + + − + − + − + − −
Cointegrating 
Relation #3 ( )
* * * *
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.20 0.21 0.11   0.40 0.73 0.11 0.02 0.01 ~ 0 .
m s o c
t t t t t t t t t t t t y P R R Q y P R Q P P I − − − − − − − − − − − + + + − + − + − + − −
The cointegrating relations are identified using Johansen's normalization procedure.
Tests for Long-Run Uncovered Interest and Purchasing Power Parity 








0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Purchasing Power Parity  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  1.00  0.00  0.00 
Uncovered Interest and 
Purchasing Power Parity 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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0Figure 2: Key Results of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995)
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions for Monetary Policy Indicator in Response to 
One-Standard Error U.S. Monetary Policy Shock






































































































































USAFigure 4: Impulse Response Functions for Short-Term Interest Rate Differential in 
Response to One-Standard Deviation U.S. Monetary Policy Shock
















































































































































Figure 5a: Impulse Response Functions for Nominal Effective Exchange Rates in 
Response to One-Standard Deviation U.S. Monetary Policy Shock

































































































































































USAFigure 5b: Impulse Response Function for U.S. Dollar Nominal Effective Exchange 
Rate in Response to One-Standard Deviation U.S. Monetary Policy Shock
















Figure 6a: Impulse Response Functions for Real Effective Exchange Rates in 
Response to One-Standard Deviation U.S. Monetary Policy Shock

































































































































































USAFigure 6b: Impulse Response Function for U.S. Dollar Real Effective Exchange Rate 
in Response to One-Standard Deviation U.S. Monetary Policy Shock
















Figure 7a: Impulse Response Functions for Effective Forward Premia in 
Response to One-Standard Deviation U.S. Monetary Policy Shock






































































































































USAFigure 7b: Impulse Response Function for U.S. Effective Forward Premium in 
Response to One-Standard Deviation U.S. Monetary Policy Shock


















Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions for Prices in Response to One-Standard 
Deviation U.S. Monetary Policy Shock













































































































































































Figure 9: Comparison of Some Key Results
qUSD/ForeignCurrency / USA ForeignCountry ξ
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Figure 10: Impulse Response Function for U.S. Dollar Real Effective and Bilateral Exchange 
Rates in Response to One-Standard Deviation Foreign Monetary Policy Shocks
Australia Canada France Germany








































































































































































































































tFigure 11a: Comparison of Results through "Counterfactual Analysis"
Step 1: Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) Specification for Extended Data Set
qUSD/DM / USD DM Q
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Figure 11b: Comparison of Results through "Counterfactual Analysis"
Step 2: Augmenting Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) Specification to Capture this Paper's
Specification of Domestic and Foreign Variables
qUSD  (effective) QUSD (effective)
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Figure 11c: Comparison of Results through "Counterfactual Analysis"
Step 3: Considering a GVAR Specification (Same Variables as in GVECM, Cholesky
Decomposition Based Shock Identification) – Effective Exchange Rates and Forward Premium
qUSD (effective) QUSD (effective)
(effective) USA ξ
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Figure 11d: Comparison of Results through "Counterfactual Analysis"
Step 3: Considering a GVAR Specification (Same Variables as in GVECM, Cholesky
Decomposition Based Shock Identification) – Bilateral Exchange Rates and Forward Premium
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Figure 11e: Comparison of Results through "Counterfactual Analysis"
Step 4: GVECM Specification (Cholesky Decomposition Based Shock Identification) –
Effective Exchange Rates and Forward Premium
























































































Figure 11f: Comparison of Results through "Counterfactual Analysis"
Step 4: GVECM Specification (Cholesky Decomposition Based Shock Identification) –
Bilateral Exchange Rates and Forward Premium
/ USD DM Q
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Figure 11g: Comparison of Results through "Counterfactual Analysis"
Step 5: GVECM Specification (Cross-Country Orthogonality of U.S. Monetary Policy 
Shocks) – Effective Exchange Rates and Forward Premium
R
DEU



























































































Figure 11h: Comparison of Results through "Counterfactual Analysis"
Step 5: GVECM Specification (Cross-Country Orthogonality of U.S. Monetary Policy 
Shocks) – Bilateral Exchange Rates and Forward Premium
qUSD/DM / USD DM Q
R
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Figure 11i: Comparison of Results through "Counterfactual Analysis"
Step 6: GVECM Specification – Effective Exchange Rates and Forward Premium
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Figure 11j: Comparison of Results through "Counterfactual Analysis"
Step 6: GVECM Specification – Bilateral Exchange Rates and Forward Premium
R
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